Inside Africa: International Involvement Increases In Mozambique’s Ongoing Counterterrorism Campaign
A sharp increase in rebel militant attacks in Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado has forced the Mozambican government to reassess its strategy against the current Islamic insurgency situation, and the international system has provided the state with a variety of opinions. The main insurgent faction is Ansar al-Sunna, known to the locals as al-Shabaab (a separate organization from the Somali al-Shabaab). The group has tenuous international connections and is thought by regional analysts to have possible ties to the Islamic State, which has been responsible for an alarming number of insurgency expansions across the African continent. This includes its arm in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali and Niger.
Armed groups have been sowing fear for more than three years in the strategic province of Cabo Delgado, which borders Tanzania and is known for its rich quantity of natural gas. While religion does play a fundamental role in the conflict, analysts believe the most important factors in the insurgency are widespread social, economic and political problems within the state of Mozambique. Unemployment, and especially youth unemployment, are considered the main causes for locals to join Islamic rebel groups. Increasing inequalities have led many young people to be easily attracted to radical movements, as religious extremist groups such as Ansar al-Sunna promise its followers that its form of Islam will act as an “antidote” to the existing “corrupt, elitist rule” they face in their daily lives. Militants are not unified but split into different cells which do not appear to coordinate their actions.
These groups have become increasingly dangerous in recent years, becoming progressively bold in their attacks against local security apparatuses while inflicting terrible violence against the local civilian population. Since the launch of its violent extremist insurgency, the group has been responsible for more than 1,300 civilian and security force deaths. In 2019, the group allegedly pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State and is acknowledged by ISIS-Core as an affiliate.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) announced the launch of the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) in April 2019 to promote the presence of ISIS-associated elements within Central, East, and Southern Africa. Its shift in operations to the African continent further showcases ISIS’ three principle functions according to the US Department of State: as a recruitment agency for militants willing to fight for its caliphate in Iraq and Syria; as a terrorist group mounting bloody attacks against civilians, and as a military organization seeking expert territorial control governance functions. Its ability to recruit in these countries outside of its usual domain of the Levant suggests a series of factors that gave rise to a more conducive environment: a demand for a quasi-revolutionary, anti-establishment discourse and practice, especially among young people who blame their relative deprivation on structural injustice; a security apparatus in disarray; the ascent and subsequent reining in of a more political, pragmatic form of Islam; the presence of pre-existing networks of jihadist or militant variety; and either lack of regional or international coordination, or, worse, regional actors backing rival groups.
International attention is quickly shifting from the issue of terrorism in the Middle East to the African continent, where it appears the plague of radical Islamic groups is quickly taken hold.
Mozambican counterinsurgency efforts have been hampered by divisions between the country’s military and its powerful police force, so it has selected to turn to private soldiers for assistance, including implementing work with foreign military contractors. South African mercenaries have been the dominant regional actor in this process, creating some setbacks for jihadist groups by destroying some of their camps and storage facilities. Nevertheless, insurgents continue to regroup and mount guerrilla attacks on security forces, while also plundering villages for food and supplies.
American Special Forces soldiers began training Mozambican troops this past week as part of an effort to repel an already spreading insurgency. The American program is relatively modest in size and scope in comparison to other counterterror training programs carried out by the superpower — a dozen Army Green Berets are assigned to train Mozambican marines for the next two months. The program, which will prioritize teaching basic soldiering skills, could lead to more ambitious American aid for Mozambique’s military including combat casualty care, planning and logistics.
John T. Godfrey, the US Department of State’s acting coordinator for counterterrorism, told reporters last week that the United States was “concerned” by the presence of private contractors who have “not demonstrably helped” to win the battle against the Islamic State. “It’s frankly a feature of the landscape in Cabo Delgado that has complicated rather than helped efforts to address the terror threat there,” Mr. Godfrey said.
Russian involvement has also become highly prevalent within the region, appearing to be driven by a desire to re-establish geopolitical influence and pursue financial gain, carving out their own area of influence across the continent by focusing on regional military and political disputes.
Over the past three years, Russia has increasingly relied on Private Military Companies (PMCs) to function as its proxies across the African continent. PCMs are for-profit organizations that provide combat, security, and logistical services for hire. The Wagner Group is the most infamous Russian PMC, run by Yevgeny Priogzhin, a Russian oligarch with close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Wagner Group contractors are notorious for fighting in support of the Assad Regime throughout the Syrian Civil War. These PMCs often are responsible for training local forces while also prioritizing the protection of the interests of Russian companies.
In Africa, Russian PMCs are currently active in Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Madagascar, Mozambique, and Libya. In 2018, five sub-Saharan African countries — including Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania — appealed to Moscow directly to help their overtaxed militaries and security services combat the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliates. Mozambique appears to be next on the Russian agenda, as military engagement and the use of private military contractors in Mozambique provides the perfect conditions to increase Russian influence in southern Africa and to enable Russian access to the state’s natural resources.
In early October 2019, Russian mercenaries and defense contractors from the Wagner Group began supporting the Mozambican military, tasked with intervening in the region with military power. At least seven Russian personnel have been killed in operations, underscoring the risks facing troops for hire within the region. Despite Russian involvement, expert officials note that there is little indication that Moscow is helping African nations counter terrorist threats.
“Outside of selling arms for their own economic benefit, Russia is not doing much to help counter extremist groups seeking to rob Africans of their future,” notes General Gregory Hadfield, Africom’s deputy intelligence director.
Despite its ongoing demise in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State could prove resurgence across the African continent if past lessons and lingering threats remain unheeded. States must go beyond security and military measures to address persistent local grievances and tension that radical groups such as ISIS have proven to be adept in exploiting. Containment becomes more important now than ever, as these groups have the potential to spread, posing a drastic threat to political and economic stability on the continental level.