Inside Africa: Ibrahim Traoré, The 36-year-old Captain who became president of Burkina Faso
September 30th, 2022, a military convoy rode through central Ouagadougou parading the country’s new leader. Less than a year earlier, the democratic regime of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré had been overthrown by the country’s military, led by Paul-Henri Damiba. In late January 2022, Damiba ousted Kaboré after six years in power, citing the government's failure to reform Burkina Faso's army to address the escalating jihadist insurgencies in the country's northern regions, linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. When the Burkinabe people gathered in September to see Damiba’s replacement, they found the face of the new ousting military commander to be rather boyish.
Ibrahim Traoré is not a child. But he is young for a coup-d’état instigating usurper. The 36-year-old captain was appointed by his predecessor to lead an artillery regiment in Kaya, a small town north from the capital, two hours’ drive into the Sahel. Now, he is the youngest president governing a country worldwide. He likes to flaunt his diverse camouflage outfits, ranging from the dark jungle green he wore while meeting Burkina Faso’s ministers, to the neon orange he donned at a conference of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). And he’s always seen wearing a red beret.
While he fits the appearance of a war-hungry military man, mysteriously, Traoré has attempted to maintain a serious and reasonable image. Right after seizing power, he assured ECOWAS, as well as Burkina Faso’s citizens, that he would honor Damiba’s commitment to reinstate civilian rule by 2024, and that an interim leader would be appointed shortly, terminating his military leadership.
However, after two weeks, on October 14th, a selection of military officials, political parties and figures of civil society appointed him the interim president. On the first anniversary of his coup, on September 29th, 2023, Traoré informed the festive Burkinabe people that elections wouldn’t be held until he has ensured it is safe for everyone to vote. Last May, just over a month before elections were finally meant to put an end to his leadership, Traoré extended the rule of his military junta for five more years in an amended charter which issued a new 60-month transition period. He also gave himself the right to contest future elections -- something the charter previously prohibited him from doing.
In the time since he took power, Traoré put an end to a military accord between Burkina Faso and France, which enabled the ex-colonial country’s Special Forces to help fight islamist insurgencies across the Sahel region through Operation Sabre. Along with Mali and Niger, Burkina Faso is distancing itself from Western aid, viewing it as ineffective in addressing their security concerns and covering neo-colonial ambitions.
Traoré has instead cozied up to Russia for military aid, calling the country a “strategic ally in acquiring weapons”. While he initially denied the presence of Wagner Group, the notorious private military company known for human rights abuses, in late January of this year, 100 of its troops were deployed in Burkina Faso, following suit from Mali and Niger, as well as other African nations such as the Central African Republic. This growing military presence in Africa, which often exchanges its services for mining concessions and access to resources such as gold, has made western politicians uneasy, as they fear it will not only lead to more violent and abrasive conflict resolution tactics, but also serve to undermine the influence they have in diplomatic and trade relations with the continent and its resources.
However, Traoré is not necessarily an anti-western political figure either. Although he held talks with Putin during the Russia-Africa summit which took place in July 2023, in an interview with RFI shortly after he seized power, he stressed that “France is a partner”, and when he ended Burkina Faso’s military cooperation with France, he stated that “the departure of the French army does not mean that France is not an ally.” While he does wish to sever post-colonial dependencies both France and Burkina Faso have to one another, Traoré’s move away from France and towards Russia is also a strategic decision designed to strengthen military power against jihadists.
While France’s military has advanced equipment, as well as effective systems of military governance and strategy, it has found the targeting and combatting of jihadists difficult. Operation Barkhane, France’s counter-terrorism operation in Mali which began in 2014, was unsuccessful due to a failure in addressing and tackling governance issues at the core of Mali’s political instability, and instead focusing heavily on military mobilization and warfare with an enemy which, for the most part, lies untraceably scattered across the more remote northern areas of the Sahel and Sahara (it was similar factors which led to the US’s failure in defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan).
Whether Wagner Group will address these problems more accurately is uncertain. The group does have less operational and moral constraints than the French national army when it comes to warfare. Yet, the military force has less troops than France had in the region, as well as less equipment. It is also unlikely to address local governance issues or other underlying drivers of the conflict, according to an article published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies. Moreover, Wagner Group directly benefits from the conflict through compensation, and has a track record in other countries such as Mozambique and CAR, of failing to- or not desiring to complete operations successfully.
This could explain Traoré’s restrained employment of Wagner. His ultimate intentions for Burkina Faso are to create a sovereign nation which does not have to rely on entanglements over resources with foreign powers. To achieve this, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali have created an Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which aims for mutual cooperation in tackling the jihadism which has spread across the Liptako-Gourma region.
Despite being founding members in 1975, the three countries left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) together on January 28th, 2023, claiming the group has “drifted from the ideals of its founding fathers and the spirit of Pan-Africanism”, and accusing the group of “being under the influence of foreign powers.” With the Alliance of Sahel States, Traoré hopes to free Burkina Faso from the CFA franc, a shared currency across many west African states which is pegged to the Euro. In a radio address, Traoré stated on the currency that he will break the bonds with “anything that maintains [Burkina Faso] in slavery”.
Traoré also plans on withdrawing mining permits from foreign companies which currently extract gold for foreign markets. In a radio address on the 5th of October, he said: “We know how to mine our gold and I don’t understand why we’re going to let multinationals come and mine it.” The statement illustrates well Traoré’s vision for Burkina Faso. While military security is a priority now, he hopes to build a more independent economy and foreign policy as well.
This clarifies the mystery about Ibrahim Traoré’s appearance. His red beret and military fatigues might undermine his ambitions as a political figure to some. However, political culture across the continent views the red beret in a symbolic way. Figures across South Africa, Ghana and Uganda wear the hat in reference to the African revolutionary known for his charisma, incorruptibility and modesty, Thomas Sankara. He renamed his home, the Republic of the Upper Volta, to ‘the land of the upright people’ - Burkina Faso - the one Traoré governs today.
Currently however, he is not doing such a great job. Between January and June this year, over 3000 fatalities have been reported across the Sahel, linked to Al Qaeda and Islamic state groups. Traoré is so far unsuccessful in ensuring the security of his nation. With his predecessor Damiba, his patience lasted only 9 months. He’s already had two years.
