Inside Africa: Gunfire At Chad’s Presidential Palace Raises Questions About Mahamat Deby’s Democracy
Shots echoed from within the presidential palace shortly before 9pm of the 8th of January 2025, in N’Djamena, the capital of Chad. Twenty-four men armed with knives had penetrated the heavily guarded palace in an attempt to take control. As they encountered security forces, fighting broke out, and 18 of the assailants were shot. The rest were taken captive.
Having met with the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi shortly before the attack, President Mahamat Deby was on site during the violence. Though no official reports confirm it, the attack may have been directed at him. As would come to light just a few days later, Deby’s party, the Patriotic Salvation Movement, had won a vast 124 of 188 seats in parliamentary votes, in what was likely yet another illegitimate election.
He certainly came to power in dramatic circumstances. In April 2021, his father Idriss Deby was winning his 7th consecutive election (also largely believed to be illegitimate), but had postponed addressing his people in victory over an emergency visit to the northern Sahara region of the country, where the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) rebels had attacked Chadian forces along the Lybian border, claiming the regions of Tibesti and Kanem.
While the senior Deby visited the frontlines and assisted in the commandment of his troops, he was hit by rebels, and died on location. In an address to the public, General Azem Bermandoa Agouna announced: “[Our president] has just breathed his last defending the sovereign nation on the battlefield.” Shortly thereafter, a military council led by his son, then a highly decorated 37-year-old general, went against Chadian Law and took control of Chad, dissolving the legislative assembly as well as Chad’s constitution.
The junior, Mahamat Deby, has since pledged a democratic reconstruction of Chad, including presidential elections and a democratic parliament. These took some years to arrive. In October 2022, impatient Chadians took to the streets demanding the elections Deby promised. 128 people were killed by security forces. When it finally came in May 2024, the presidential elections were largely disputed by the opposition Les Transformateurs (The Transformers) led by Succès Masra, as well as international rights groups including the International Federation for Human Rights. They claimed Deby’s tally, which was at 61%, was fraudulent.
Masra, who had been the prime minister of a transitional government in the months leading up to the election, also appealed the constitutional council to challenge the results, a motion which was rejected on the grounds of insufficient proof.
This is why, when parliamentary elections were held on December 29th, 2024, for the first time in a decade, much of the opposition chose to boycott, alleging that the process would simply mirror the flawed presidential election. Masra, who’s party came second, called it a “charade”. Indeed, with a participation rate of just 51.56%, disillusionment among Chad’s population is clear.
Deby’s electoral theatrics become more convincing. His hold over 66% of the National Assembly is large, even if it falls in line with his father’s grasp over the country’s parliament. It also contradicts the statement he made after the election, when he claimed it would “pave the way for the era of decentralisation so long-awaited and desired by the Chadian people”. That being said, a boycott from the opposition doesn’t exactly stop Deby from tightening his grasp of power over Chad.
Deby appears strong and popular after the recent parliamentary votes, even if only half the country participated. He wants to ride on that opportunity. It’s why the government largely dismissed the attackers of the presidential palace as drunken “Pieds Nickeles” (three robbers from a French cartoon, who always fumble their exploits). Some speculated that the attack might have been carried out by the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, which operates in the western part of the country around Lake Chad. However, Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah dismissed this possibility.
Other rebel groups, of which there are a few in the more remote regions of the country, have also been suspected, but the government has tried to disparage any serious concerns for threat in an attempt to sugar-coat the reality, even though tanks and increased military personnel were reported in N’Djamena the following day. Whoever is behind the attacks, it is clear that some people in Chad want to see Deby removed from power. Some have employed violent methods. Whatever the attack was, it was everything short of an attempted coup-d’état.
It is a truth which doesn’t do Deby any favours. In the previous two decades, Chad under the senior Deby largely benefitted from a military accord with France, which helped the country tackle rebel insurrections, notably in 2008 and 2019. French military forces also helped contain Boko Haram’s islamist terrorism (Boko Haram is based in lake Chad, which is shared by Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon - the group operates across all countries).
Yet Deby has recently ended Chad’s military cooperation agreement with France, and has called for the military planes, vehicles, and 1000 personnel to leave the country by the end of January 2025. Foreign Minister Adberaman Koulamallah said that France “must now also consider that Chad has grown up, matured and is a sovereign state that is very jealous of its sovereignty.” Chad was its last military operation in the Sahel region, after being recently expulsed from most states once colonised by France.
Though Koulamallah also said that France was “an essential partner”, Chad has recently signed a deal with Hungary, expecting 200 soldiers to support and train local forces. Chad is also looking towards Russia, Turkey, and the UAE to diversify its military assistance. The latter could be somewhat problematic for Deby. UN reports suggest the UAE is providing weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a militia currently waging war in neighbouring Sudan which has been accused of committing scores of human rights abuses, especially on non-Arab populations which include the Zaghawa clan.
According to Ulf Laessing, head of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung’s Sahel programme, “If the RSF militia loses the war, it could well be that Zaghawa people will then try to take revenge on Deby.” It’s yet another gamble Deby takes in cutting ties with French military aid. Under his father, France ensured security and stability. To some extent, this also kept him in power. As Macron stated after the news of his unexpected death: “France has lost a brave friend.” But the son’s shakeup creates a difficult vacuum to fill. The recent attacks on the presidential palace certainly testify to a lack of control over Chad’s security.
While Mahamat Deby’s severance with France boosted his popularity, it also leaved Chad more exposed to security concerns. Politically, this also makes Deby’s hold over power more vulnerable. This will cost the country monetarily since, as Laessing claims, “Chad’s budget is spent on patronage to secure government survival.” In order to democratize Chad, as he claims is his intention, Deby will have to compromise on the current trajectory. A backsliding into authoritarianism is not on his agenda. Yet judging by recent news coming from Chad, maybe it is, nonetheless.
