Mideast: What Role Does Iran Play in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict?
Valery Sharifulin
As Armenia and Azerbaijan ramp up clashes near their borders, presumably for control of Nagorno-Karabakh, one key geopolitical actor whom has remained fairly neutral on the conflict has been Iran. What role, if any, does Iran play in tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan and how true is it that it will simply back Azerbaijan, who it shares cultural and religious ties with?
As conflict reaches a dangerous climax in Armenia and Azerbaijan, one regional player is seemingly staying neutral. While Turkey and even Russia make overtures about the conflict, Iran has remained in a gray position and has not come out and made outwardly vocal which country it supports. In recent history Iran has actually been an ally of Armenia, most likely as a response to irredentist claims made by Azeris and its giving Iran a means to further oppose its sometimes geopolitical rival Turkey.
Although Iran and Turkey are similar in many ways, indeed having some of the same regional enemies, both remain distrustful of each other and are tentatively on different sides of some of the major regional conflicts currently taking place in the Middle East and in peripheral areas. In Yemen, where Turkey supports the Yemini establishment, Iran backs Houthi rebels. In Syria, where Turkey supports the opposition, Iran continues to back president Bashar al-Assad. This however is further complicated when taking into account Libya where both countries back the same political entity, or even with aggression against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) which both countries seem to have a disdain for. Nonetheless Iran owing to its complicated relationship with Turkey will undoubtedly be affected by conflict on its northern borders. Turkey is an outspoken ally of Azerbaijan and its support of the Iranian neighbor may pose a geopolitical risk to Iran, whom has a stake in stability as well as countering Turkish nationalist sentiments floating amongst Azeri Turkish circles within Iran and around its borders.
Iran, Azeris, and Azerbaijan
Azeris in Iran purportedly make up 1/4th of the country’s population. In fact, Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is of at least partial Azeri descent. Iran continues to have a complicated, and frequently antagonistic, relationship with its Azeri population. In the past Iran has discriminated against Azeri citizens in the form of language discrimination as well as have allegedly been complicit in racism and stereotyping in media. In recent history the topic of Azeri nationalism has arisen, and with it calls to strengthen ties in the Azeri Iranian community with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Iran is weary of the possibility of its Azeri neighbor mobilizing the country’s own Azeri population against the state, as well as the secular nature of the Azerbaijani state and its ties with regional powers not least of which is Turkey, but also Israel, a unabashed enemy of the Islamic Iranian state.
With that said Iran has not committed to formally opposing the Azerbaijani state on the international stage and has instead called for mediation and an end to conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan; instead of outwardly supporting one side or the other like Turkey and Iran have done. Various representatives of the Iranian regime have vocally supported Azerbaijan while Turkish publications have alleged that Iran is actually secretly supporting Armenia in the conflict.
Future Iranian Involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Shortly after clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan resumed in late September, Iran came out and urged both states to mediate their differences and abide by a recently enforced ceasefire. In the past, when it came to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran has played a important role in mediation, but has also been tacitly inclined to supporting Armenia. Yet in more recent happenings, it has assured Azerbaijan that it does not provide Armenia with any material resources, making it clear that did not move military equipment into Armenia, nor will it step back from its recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
Iran will have the difficulty of balancing its tense relationship with Azerbaijan with its historical support of Armenia. In the current conflict although the state may continue advocating mediation and a peaceful resolve to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict its involvement in the crisis will most likely be met with suspicion by Azerbaijan, and also by Azeris within Iran who would like it to be much more supportive of the Azerbaijani state.
With all this said perhaps a more general take away from Iran’s involvement with its northern South Caucasus neighbors is just how important it is not to take for granted how foreign relations are developed and cultivated. Indeed, it would be all to easy to assume that Iran would back an Islamic majority neighbor in the conflict against a Christian majority state. Nonetheless, historical circumstances and shared goals has made it so that Iran and Armenia have become regional partners. Armenia needs a strong relationship with a powerful regional player such as Iran to remain formidable against Azerbaijan and its sturdy Turkish backing. And Iran craves stability in its borderlands and pushback from the rising tide of Azeri Turkish nationalism.
Perhaps it would make the most sense to argue that Iran will more explicitly support Armenia in the future if tensions between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran come to a head. Indeed, Armenia would be the most obvious regional ally in such a situation. But so long as Iran can afford to remain neutral in the Armenian Azerbaijani conflict it will do so. Because outwardly supporting one party against the other may pull Iran into yet another regional conflict, a perilous possibility considering how spread thin the country is in the many conflicts currently waging in the region.
