Mideast: Sadr’s Enduring Hold Over Iraq
ASAAD NIAZI
It was recently speculated that Muqtada al-Sadr, the famous Iraqi Shi’i cleric and militia leader, may be running for Prime Minister in Iraq’s parliamentary election in June. This comes after years of actively influencing the political and security situation in the country while rejecting that he would be vying for Iraq’s top government position. Sadr continues to hold massive influence in Iraq most significantly in poorer areas with a working class Shi’i population. But some have argued that his influence in waning. Is this true, or does Sadr really have an enduring hold in Iraq?
Muqtada al-Sadr rose up in Iraq’s post-occupation political and security environment as one of the country’s most influential leaders. After forming the Mahdi Army shortly after the US invasion as an insurgent militant group Sadr rose in infamy as an outspoken opponent of the US led occupation of the country. The mid-ranking cleric was also known for stoking sectarian tension within the country by allowing his militia men to target Iraqi Sunnis with impunity. But as the years went on, Sadr actively changed his persona and built up a reputation in Iraq as being a so-called Iraqi nationalist with much more moderate positions. Of course, this has been met with suspicion and Sadr has been known to frequently change stances on differing issues while maintaining that he is an advocate for the Iraqi people rather than looking out for his own self-interests. His image is continuingly being comprised however as he has constantly harassed Iraqi protestors and usurped the mantle of ongoing Iraqi demonstrations to further his own narrow political ambitions. Recent speculations that Sadr will campaign in Iraq’s upcoming election has reignited conversations on the influence of the clerical leader as well as his ability to drum up political support.
Role in Iraqi Protests and Stance on Iran
When a strong wave of protests in Iraq reprised in 2019, Sadr and his supporters were among the first to voice their support of the movement while also usurping the demonstrations to further Sadr’s own immediate political ambitions. Sadr used mass demonstrations to intimidate Iraq’s then-current leadership as well as campaign for the end of American troop presence in the country. But as protests continued to rage on, Sadr began ordering his followers to withdraw from the movement. The cleric accused protestors of ‘immorality’ and sent in enforcers to intimidate and end protests. Sadr supporters have on numerous times clashed with protestors, and have even opened fire on demonstrators. Sadr has thus far cultivated an increasingly adversarial relationship with Iraqi demonstrators which negatively affects his popular support in a drastic fashion. This coupled with a budding relationship with Iran has curtailed any notion that Sadr is an ‘Iraqi nationalist’. Indeed, ties to Iran has effectively have put an end to his re-branding as an anti-foreign influence leader and his relationship to Iran is amongst the most complex and everchanging political position he has. Sadr has flip-flopped on numerous times over his relationship with Iraq’s neighbor. Recently, he has seemingly pivoted to tacitly supporting relations with the country.
When Sadr rose to infamy in 2003, he retained a relatively close relationship with Iran. But as he sought to rebrand himself as a viable leader for Iraq he began spouting rhetoric of a independent Iraq without Iranian influence, largely in a effort to coerce Iran into handling relations on his own terms. However, as demonstrations in Iraq began threatening the status-quo of Iranian control over Iraq, Sadr began shifting positions on his views on Iran and has come under the side of Iran probably for reasons of political or personal expediency. Again, this has destroyed any credibility Sadr had with demonstrators and has resulted in increasingly suspicious attitudes towards his ambitions in Iraq.
Losing Influence?
Suspicions of Sadr’s waning influence have frequently centered around the effects of his decision-making around Iraqi demonstrations as well as his constantly shifting positions which have tarnished his image in the eyes of many Iraqis. Many feel a sense of betrayal over Sadr’s fluctuating political maneuverings and it can be readily argued that as long as he continues to favor narrow political ambitions instead of garnering wider popular support the potential of a wide-ranging Sadrist base is impossible. Sadr will continue to drum up support from a loyal base that has more or less stuck with the cleric since his arrival in Iraq’s political scene after 2003. But if the leader had aspirations in obtaining the support of Iraq’s other populations, his dreams may be dashed.
If Sadr does indeed campaign for Prime Minister in June, he may very well get the position. But, as in 2018, his win may be a product of parliamentary maneuvering and clientelist politics. Not a reflection of the popular will of the Iraqi people. So, it could be argued that its wont matter if Sadr loses influence in Iraq. Just as long as he retains a small and popular base and is allowed to maneuver as he wishes in Iraq’s flawed political infrastructure, Sadr will continue to hold power in Iraq. But if concrete steps are taken to amend Iraq’s current political system, either by introducing a new electoral system, amending the constitution, targeting corruption, or even introducing another style of legislature in the country, Sadr then may see his hold over the country formidably threatened. Perhaps that is at the heart of why Sadr prefers the status quo and withdrew support from demonstrations. If one remains hopeful, protests may bring change to the country, and disreputable figures such as Sadr may not benefit from such change.
