India Insights: What the Missile Exchanges Between Tehran and Islamabad Mean for New Delhi

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On January 16, 2024, the Iranians launched missile strikes on Pakistani territory in the Balochistan province. These strikes were after the Iranians launched strikes in Iraq and Syria following the ISIS terrorist attack in Iran on January 4th. The Iranian foreign ministry stated that the reason for the attack was to target an “Iranian terrorist group” operating in Pakistan. In response, the Pakistanis said that the attack was “illegal,” recalled its ambassador in Iran, and blocked Tehran’s ambassador to Islamabad from returning. Two days later, the Pakistanis fired missiles into Iranian territory, which Islamabad claimed to be hitting “BLA targets.” Pakistan’s response is the first time another country has attacked Iran on Iranian soil since Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980, starting the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). While the Iranians and the Pakistanis had interests to de-escalate in the short term, this incident “has damaged Iran-Pakistan relations.”

History of Pakistan-Iran Relations

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan, and Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was the first head of state to visit the country. Aside from the religious connection, during the Cold War, the Iranians and the Pakistanis were close allies of the U.S., while India - even though it claimed non-alignment - tilted towards the Soviet Union. Hence, Iran perceived Pakistan as a strategic country to contain the spread of communism. During the 1965 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan, Tehran actively supplied Pakistan with money and arms. For example, the Shah said, “Iran has no aggressive intentions, but it will not accept any attempt to liquidate Pakistan. The Power and India must be fully aware of our resolution.... We do not want a new Vietnam on the frontier of Iran.”

The turning point was in 1979: the Iranian Revolution and Zia-ul-Haq’s military coup. Overnight, Iran became an anti-American Shi’a theocracy, while Pakistan (still close to the Americans) became a conservative Sunni Islamacized society. Hence, the Pakistanis became very close with the Saudis after this period. For example, during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), the Pakistanis and Saudis supported various Sunni groups, while the Iranians supported various Shi’a groups that fought against Moscow under the “mujahideen.”

During the first Taliban regime (1996-2001), the Saudis and Pakistanis supported the Taliban, while the Iranians backed the Northern Alliance. Nevertheless, the Pakistanis have sought to stay neutral throughout the Iranian-Saudi rivalry. Pakistan depends on Riyadh for economic assistance by providing loans, and Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia send remittances back home. At the same time, Pakistan shares a border with Iran, and while it is a Sunni-majority country, it has a sizeable Shi’a minority. 

Baloch Issue

At the heart of the tensions between Tehran and Islamabad is the Baloch insurgency issue. The Balochis are a Sunni majority ethnolinguistic group that lives in Iran, Pakistan, and parts of Afghanistan. During the 20th century, the region was split into two: Iran annexed West Baluchistan in 1928, and the Pakistanis took the eastern half in 1947 after the British left. In Iran and Pakistan, the Balochis feel discriminated against by the government. The Sistan-Baluchestan province is one of the poorest provinces in Iran, and the Balochis have sought greater representation in Pakistan. Importantly, this problem predates the Iranian Revolution.

Amid the Iranian and Pakistani’s neglect of the province, three main insurgent groups emerged: Jundullah, the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), and Jaish ul-Adl (an offshoot of Jundallah), which claims to advocate for Balochi rights. However, these groups do not represent the entirety of the Baloch people.

Jundallah, translating to “Soldiers of God,” is a Salafist group fighting an insurgency against the Iranian government over resentment of a lack of economic development. Jundallah has been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in Iran, such as on October 18, 2009, at least 40 people were killed, and 15 of them were members of the IRGC. The BLA is an ethnonational Baloch organization that has waged an insurgency against the Pakistani government for its neglect of the province and human rights violations by the Pakistani government against Balochis. On several occasions, the BLA has been responsible for attacks on Chinese economic activities. For example, the BLA is behind many of the attacks on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, such as an attack on Wednesday, March 27, that killed about 13 Chinese workers.

However, Iran accuses Pakistan of providing a haven to Jundullah/Jaish ul-Adl, while Pakistan accuses Iran of offering sanctuary to the BLA. The Iranian government has threatened to strike Pakistan, and there have been instances, such as in 2013, in which the Iranians reportedly launched strikes against 15 terrorists. In 2017, after a Jaish ul-Adl attack, the Iranian army chief threatened to attack Pakistan. Moreover, like other instances, Tehran has accused the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of funding these groups.

Impact on India

On the surface, the country that would benefit the most from this episode is India. However, the reality is much more complicated. India’s external affairs ministry said, “This is a matter between Iran and Pakistan. Insofar as India is concerned, we have an uncompromising position of zero tolerance towards terrorism. We understand actions that countries take in their self-defense.” Nevertheless, the External Affairs Minister Jaishankar was in Tehran from January 14-15, and while there is no evidence that indicates any Indian involvement with the strikes, the timing reinforces the Pakistani narrative that India seeks to encircle Pakistan through Afghanistan and Iran, especially as the Chabahar Port is about 170 km from the Gwadar Port.

The incident between Tehran and Islamabad could give Pakistan greater strategic significance for the U.S. in “countering Iran.”Additionally, given that India has a port in the Sistan Baluchestan province, any instability in that region would undermine India’s efforts to expand its economic engagement in Afghanistan through the Chabahar Port.

Perhaps most importantly, the attack from Iran illustrates the nature of a possible Pakistani reaction to an attack on its territory.

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