India Insights: The Politics of India’s Nuclear Weapons Program
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On May 18, 1974, the Indian government successfully tested its first “peaceful” nuclear test, known as “Smiling Buddha.” This test officially made India a nuclear state, and it was the first to be conducted by a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. The permanent members of the UNSC are the US, UK, France, China (before 1971, Taiwan/the Republic of China held the position, but after 1971, the PRC has had this position), and Russia (the Soviet Union until 1991). The next successful test occurred in 1998, known as “Operation Shakti” and this test caught the CIA by surprise.
The international community's reactions to India’s nuclear tests were divided. After the 1974 test, while backlash from Pakistan and China was expected, the Americans and Canadians were very critical. By contrast, the French and Soviets were less critical and even stepped in to supply enriched uranium. After the 1998 test, aside from Pakistan (to be expected), much like 1974, the U.S. was very critical of the test and imposed economic sanctions along with Canada, Japan, and other countries. By contrast, France, Russia, and the U.K. refrained from condemning India or imposing economic sanctions.
The primary motivation for India's decision to develop nuclear weapons was security, especially after the Indian loss in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Additionally, by the 1970s, the China-Pakistan relationship was solidified, adding to a two-front hostile border. However, according to Scott Sagan in “Why do States Develop Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” India developed the nuclear bomb due to the role of India’s scientific community in lobbying the government to have one. Additionally, prestige may have been a factor, viewing nuclear weapons as a source of national pride, which is commonly cited to explain France’s decision to go nuclear.
Federation of american scientists
Today, it has the 6th largest nuclear weapons arsenal, and along with Russia, the US, the UK, France, China, North Korea, and Pakistan are countries that officially have nuclear weapons. Israel is reportedly a nuclear state; however, the official policy of the Israeli government is that they don’t admit or deny having them and will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
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India’s nuclear program has had an immense impact on domestic politics, such as the India-US civilian nuclear agreement. In 2008, the US and India negotiated a deal that would increase nuclear cooperation between the two countries, and Washington would end its ban on exporting nuclear materials to India. However, this deal had immense opposition from certain factions in India. At the time, a bloc of left-wing parties withdrew their support and the communist party insisted that this deal would give the US too much influence over India’s foreign policy. On President Obama’s second visit to India in 2015, various protestors from the left chanted, “Barack Obama, hands off India.” In 2007, the BJP said the deal was an “assault on the nuclear sovereignty and foreign policy options.” The BJP’s party platform says that the “BJP is opposed to the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal in its present form.” Nevertheless, in reality, the Russians still dominate India’s nuclear trade, and India has signed a similar civilian nuclear deal with France - indicating that India seeks to diversify its nuclear partners.
In addition, it has impacted the public perception regarding the value and necessity of nuclear weapons. According to a survey conducted in 2022, about 68% believed that India needed nuclear weapons more than its enemies, and only a few thought India shouldn’t have any weapons. Moreover, during a campaign speech in April 2024, Narendra Modi said that India would not be safe without nuclear weapons and attacked the Indian opposition party for their stance on nuclear disarmament. (Even though in reality the opposition shares more or less the same position). In general, the anti-nuclear protests have long been suppressed – even during the Congress Party. For example, in 2012, a report by an anti-nuclear coalition argued that protestors in Kudankulam were denied democratic rights. Hence, at the time, protesting nuclear weapons was considered “sedition” and “treasonous.”
In addition to the impact on domestic politics, India’s nuclear program has had immense foreign policy implications. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was created in 1968 and prohibits its signatories from developing nuclear weapons. However, this treaty allows for the development of peaceful nuclear energy. (Iran justifies its right to enrich uranium on its soil based on this provision. However, India refused to sign it and in 1968, Indira Gandhi stated that
“Aid or no aid, India will not sign the non-proliferation treaty…Under the existing circumstances the treaty is not in the interest of India…No one can force us to do anything that may be against the interests of the country.”
This refusal doesn’t mean that India is against disarmament, in fact, in 1954, India was one of the first countries to call for a ban on nuclear testing and in 1978, a nuclear freeze. However, the reason for refusing to sign it is that New Delhi views the treaty as discriminatory and one Indian diplomat said that it is “nuclear apartheid.”
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From India’s perspective, it is unfair that only five countries are internationally recognized to possess nuclear weapons as per the NPT, which are the US, Russia/Soviet Union, France, the UK, and China. (All of them are members of the P5 as well). Hence, from India’s view, disarmament should apply to everyone – including the US and Russia. Crucially, refusing to sign the NPT is a position shared by the Congress and BJP. In 2009, India’s ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, cited a speech by Manmohan Singh and said
“there is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India’s national security and will remain so, pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament.”
Similarly, in 2021, in a statement released by India’s External Affairs Ministry, it said that,
“India continues to attach high priority to and remains committed to universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. India does not support the Treaty, and shall not be bound by any of the obligations that may arise from it. India believes that this Treaty does not constitute or contribute to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms.”
In addition to India’s problems with the NPT, there is concern about the usage of nuclear weapons amid tensions with China and Pakistan. Proponents of nuclear weapons argue that they are “weapons of peace” and that the threat of mutually assured destruction has prevented the US and the USSR from a direct hot war. In certain respects, the fact that India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons has had some impact on deterrence since India and Pakistan have not fought a major war since becoming nuclear. One of the reasons for Pakistan going nuclear is to “level the playing field” since Pakistan has lost every single conventional war against India. This logic can describe the reason for North Korea having nuclear weapons, rightly viewing that it cannot win a conventional war against the US.
Nevertheless, the risk of a nuclear conflict in the subcontinent hasn’t fully disappeared. For example, India has a policy of “no first use,” which means that India will not use nuclear weapons against another country unless it gets attacked. In 2020, India’s ambassador to the UN, Pankaj Sharma, reiterated this policy by emphasizing that it will not use nuclear weapons first – at the height of tensions with the Chinese. Likewise, the Chinese also have a policy of “no first use,” whereas the U.S. does not. However, there is criticism of the no-first-use policy in India, arguing that it limits India’s policy options against Pakistan. Notably, Rajnath Singh’s statement, India’s defense minister, said, “Till today, our nuclear policy is ‘no first use’. What happens in the future depends on the circumstances.” Singh’s statement alleged that India has ended its no-first-use policy. Likewise, China’s recent buildup of nuclear weapons has had the US questioning China’s commitment to no first use.
Additionally, like how the US and USSR went to the brink during the Cuban Missile Crisis and many other dangerous situations, similar situations have happened between India and Pakistan. During the Kargil War in 1999, the escalation of tensions created fears that nuclear weapons could be used. In 2002, after an attack in Jammu, while the Indians rejected the first use of nuclear weapons, then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf refused to put out a no-first-use policy and said that “possession of nuclear weapons by any state obviously implies they will be used under some circumstance.” Recently in 2019, after the Pulwama terrorist attack increased tensions between India and Pakistan, according to former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, India and Pakistan almost had a nuclear exchange. In his memoir Never Give an Inch, Pompeo wrote that
“I do not think the world properly knows just how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to spilling over into a nuclear conflagration in February 2019.”
As with any other weapon and technology, nuclear weapons must be treated with the utmost caution. Importantly, as illustrated with the Russia-Ukraine War, while many dismiss Russian threats to use nuclear weapons as mere rhetoric, there is no telling that one day these threats will not be rhetoric.
