Mideast: Trolls Under the Red Sea
Zoonar GmbH
The Houthis Of Yemen Have Become the gatekeepers of a vital global shipping artery
The Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, more commonly known as the Houthi movement, is a rebel political party backed by Iran. The Houthis originated when impoverished, frustrated, and fervently religious young men in Yemen rejected what they viewed as a Saudi-influenced, corrupt Yemeni government. When full-blown civil war broke out in 2014, the Houthis captured territory and, since a ceasefire in 2022, have become de facto rulers in the populous West coast of Yemen.
The Iran-backed militia challenges the authority of the Yemeni government. Saudi Arabia and the UAE led a long aerial campaign against the Houthis to back the internationally recognized government. The violence subsided in 2022. Despite the tenuous ceasefire, Yemen remains a fractured nation. Almost 20 million people need humanitarian assistance, making it one of the largest humanitarian crises on earth.
Houthis At War
The Houthi’s territory on the Red Sea coast makes it a valuable asset to the Iranian Axis of Resistance. They are allied with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, smaller militias in Iraq, and the state of Iran. Most of the groups in the Axis of Resistance are designated terror organizations in the US and UK.
Since Hamas’ October 7th attack on Israel, which murdered over 1200 Israelis and pitched the region into violence and uncertainty, the Axis of Resistance has waged war against Israel, supposedly in support of the Palestinian people. The Houthis are part of this effort. They have constantly launched missiles and drones at Israel since the beginning of the war, most of which were shot down by the US-Israel coalition. The US, UK, and Israel have all carried out heavy strikes against the Houthi militias, attempting to cripple their arsenals, ports, and telecommunication centers. The strikes have had mixed efficacy.
Ansar Allah’s war with Israel has changed them very much. Firstly, they won a lot of popular support in Yemen for claiming to be on the front lines of the Palestinian cause, a cause very important to people in Yemen; or, said in another way, the front lines against Israel, for Israel is also a popular enemy in Yemen. Secondly, the Houthis have established themselves as a threat to global shipping in the Red Sea and have turned this piracy into a revenue stream.
The Houthis began attacking ships in the Red Sea soon after the war started to stem commerce to and from Israel and its allies in Europe. In November, the Bahamian-flagged Galaxy Leader cargo ship and its multinational crew of 25 were chugging through the Red Sea from Turkey on its way to India. It never got there because Houthi militants took the ship and its crew hostage.
The barrage of container ships, which typically steam through the Red Sea, turned into a wary trickle. Shipping companies, captains, and governments feared for the safety of their crews and products after successful missile strikes and highjackings by the Houthi militiamen. Global shipping in the Red Sea fell by over 60 percent in the first year of the War.
Experts estimate USD 200 billion lost in the global economy due to Houthi-led disruptions. Shipping companies were forced to use routes that circumvented Africa’s southernmost reaches, significantly farther than the short Red Sea and Suez Canal into the Mediterranean. Some countries lost more than others. Egypt was the biggest loser as the Suez Canal canal typically makes up two percent of the Egyptian gross domestic product. Middle East Eye reports they lost USD seven billion to Red Sea unrest in 2024 compared with 2023. The US has spent nearly USD five billion using its Navy to patrol the Red Sea and prevent attacks.
The Economist published an article shortly before the ceasefire in Gaza was finalized that investigated the profitability of the scheme they had arranged. Speaking to UN investigators, they determined that some high-ranking Houthi leaders use their businesses to process transactions that can purchase safe passage for ships. They estimate these rents net the Houthi organizations USD 180 million each month. The Houthis reject the accusation of charging rent and explain that they are simply asking companies to request permits.
Either way, it is clear that only ships on the good side of the Houthis have been comfortable in passage over the last year; companies paying the troll-under-the-bridge or ships from nations friendly with Iran, such as China or Russia. Since the attacks began, Russian oil passing through the Suez Canal rose to 50 percent of the total oil. Before the attacks, they only constituted one-third. Chinese ships went from making up less than fifteen percent of ship traffic in the Bab al-Mandap strait (southern Red Sea) to more than twenty percent over the first year of the war.
Post-Ceasefire
The Houthis continually promised that if Israel ceased its attacks, the Houthis would too. So, have they stopped the attacks in light of the ceasefire? It’s complicated. Officially, they announced that only Israeli ships of ships bound for Israel would still be under threat of attack. However, this is a dynamic position.
Houthi spokesmen made it clear that they would determine what was an acceptable ceasefire, not Israel. For example, the Houthis threatened to continue attacks based on Israel’s actions in the West Bank, which, although violent and widely criticized, do not violate the terms of their ceasefire with Hamas.
The Houthis are still attempting to present themselves as legitimate arbiters of law and safety in the Red Sea. The organization that “sanctions” nations or ships and offers “permits” is called the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre. Insert eye roll here. It sounds nicer than Troll-Under-The-Bridge.
No one can know the Houthi leaders’ true ambitions but themselves. Especially as global attitudes continue to fall against Israel’s favor, the Houthis will see the Red Sea as a cash cow and pathway toward legitimacy. While threatening to take over ships is not the most sophisticated nor delicate diplomacy, it is nonetheless engagement. If the world engages back, the Houthis will take strides toward becoming recognized governors of Yemen’s West Coast and thus party to Red Sea traffic control.
What happens next depends on how well the ceasefire holds between Israel and Hamas. The world is at an inflection point. New leaders are proving unpredictable, global opinion is segregated from global power, violence is spreading, and the end is not in sight. The Houthi’s political and economic goals both center on the Red Sea. They will not give up the keys to the bridge quickly.
