Mideast: Airstrikes on US targets in Iraq and the role of Pro-Iranian Militias
John Moore
When Qassim Soleimani was killed in an airstrike in early 2020, the motivations for his targeted killing rested on the fact that in previous days, airstrikes aimed at the US embassy and army bases in Iraq were conducted by people close to the Iranian general. The other man killed in that airstrike was Abu Mahdi al-Mohandas, a top leader in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and commander of the Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH). KH, not to be confused with the Lebanese militant group that shares its name (all though there are a plethora of similarities), were the entities behind these airstrike campaigns on the US embassy and army forces. The assassination of these two figures has had significant ramifications in Iraq and recently with KH allegedly perpetuating similar airstrike campaigns against US targets in Iraq, it seems as if aggression by anti-US elements in the country has continued irrespective of these leader’s deaths.
In past weeks, rockets have been periodically attacking the US Embassy and Baghdad’s Green and although no group has yet to be tied to the attacks, Trump‘s Administration has begun blaming those same Shi’ite forces tied to Iran and linked with the Popular Mobilization Forces and KH. Another possible source of the attacks, is a new organization, the so-called “League of the Revolutionaries”, which has been purported by Iranian state media to have been responsible for a US military plane crash in an area within Baghdad’s governorate on June 8, as well as a recent strike on Baghdad’s airport. Information on this alleged group remains limited and considering the recent pattern of behavior of KH and other pro-Iranian factions of the PMF it seems like the group is still waging conflict against US presence in Iraq.
Motivations
The actions of Kata’ib Hezbollah and other Pro-Iranian factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces, including the Badr Brigade (BO) and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), are intimately tied to Iran and the presence of US forces within Iraq. There are fundamentally two explanations of why these groups have the motivation to attack US presence in the and target US army bases and the American embassy: A) the will of the current Iranian regime whom these militia groups are essentially proxies of and B) the historical background of these organizations stemming back to their inception after the 2003 Iraq invasion.
The Role of Iran
These militia groups, although previously state-sanctioned, have essentially worked as Iranian proxies owing both to their Shiite makeup but more importantly to their network of support from Iran. The existence of KH, BO, and AAH lay in the growth of insurgency forces in Iraq after the ousting of Saddam Hussein and the initial presence of US (and UK coalition) troops in Iraq after 2003. To take KH as an example, the organization was founded after 2003 and was known for its attacks on American and coalition forces as well as its numerous IED attacks targeting both US and Iraqi forces. It’s leader, the aforementioned Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was an Iranian ally and part of the Saddam-era outlawed Da’wa party which had extensive ties to Iranian Republic. To give an idea of his intimate connections with Iran he had previously stated that he “hoped to turn Iraq into a Shiite state similar to Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979”. The Iranian regime, and especially it’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), has given KH and the other pro-Iranian militias of the PMF both financial and material resources as well as helped militias strategically, as illustrated by militia leaders connections with Soleimani, who was head of the covert al-Quds unit of the IRGC.
Previous KH Interactions with the United States
In terms of historical background, especially as it relates to these militias backgrounds with US forces, as alluded to above, these armed groups were founded directly as a consequence of US intervention in Iraq. As such, their reception to US presence in the country is directly tied to and influenced by previous interaction between the two entities. KH had waged before the formation of the PMF numerous skirmishes with US and coalition forces, as did the BO and AAH. These organizations were (and are) directly opposed to US intervention and sought through insurgency campaigns in Iraq’s Shiite strongholds to intimidate and push out US forces. KH was designated a terrorist group back in 2008 and through the Popular Mobilization Forces has like the other above groups since 2014 been able to nominally legitimize itself within Iraq’s security and military environment. KH still fully opposes US influence in the country and attacks on Baghdad’s Green Zone and other key areas of US presence in the country showcase the aggressive ways in which it makes this sentiment known. According to the CIA World Factbook, KH seeks to “counter US influence and, ultimately, overthrow the Iraqi Government to install a government based on Shia Muslim laws and precepts”. Perhaps seeking a wholesale overthrow of Iraq’s government may be hyperbolic, but Kata’ib Hezbollah and the other pro-Iranian factions of the PMF certainly seek to influence Baghdad’s governance, and through their infiltration of Iraq’s security forces and their formidable influence on Iraqi politicians their sway continues to be extremely palpable.
What Can be Done?
Iraq remains in turmoil not lest because of problems stemming from KH and other pro-Iranian militias. The PMF remains an important part of Iraq’s security structure and moves to incorporate the organization into Iraq’s security forces has produced limited results An Iraqi response to airstrikes has so far been limited but the government has in the past condemned US retaliatory airstrikes conducted on Iraqi soil against these militia groups. The US faces ongoing pressure to leave the country, and any sort of heavy-handed military action against KH other belligerent groups would no doubt be scrutinized as overstepping Iraq’s territorial integrity. With that said, there is a way in which the United States can be effective in countering KH aggression, or whoever is the possible conductor of these recent airstrikes.
Working with the Iraqi government and the recently appointed Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi should be priority number one for the US, especially as it relates to cultivating strong diplomatic relations with the war-torn country and its fledgling leadership. Moreover, perhaps the old adage of counter-insurgency strategy: “winning the hearts and minds” of the country’s citizenry, can be effective in decreasing popular support for rebel groups. Iraq’s post-Saddam generation is quickly growing to adulthood and the United States has a chance at fixing its image problem in the country. The power that a citizenry has in making or breaking militia groups cannot be overstated. KH, BO, AAH, and other belligerent factions rely on local support to wage aggression against their targets. If these same citizens were provided an alternative to the material resources that are garnered from joining these militias, a bloodless solution to the problem of militia aggression may quickly be found. The rise and continued strength of KH and other armed groups should not be isolated from their historical context. The 2003 American invasion brought these groups to existence and it is no wonder that they continue to wage conflict against the United States. Tact diplomacy and an eye towards the Iraqi population may be the best way in dealing with militia groups and their attacks on US sites in the country.
