European Central: Exploring Converging And Diverging Military Service Policies In Europe
Max Mumby/Indigo
European countries have taken diverse approaches to military recruitment since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, many European nations turned from conscription to all-volunteer forces. This was partly due to the disappearance of a direct military menace in the form of the Soviet Union, as well as the increasingly common view of conscription as an ‘outdated and inefficient’ method of building and sustaining a military force. However, as security concerns have once again become a pressing matter in Europe, especially in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, leaders on the continent have turned their attention to military expansion and recruitment, examining the possibility of reinstating conscription to bolster troop strength and enhance military readiness.
Military service policies across Europe have long been diverse and fragmented. The transition to volunteer military forces started in Western Europe with Belgium and the Netherlands in the mid-1990s. It expanded eastward as more countries became NATO members in the 1990s and 2000s. These countries, some recently freed from Soviet domination, embraced the defense policy of the alliance. Many countries began to downsize and transform their armed forces to ‘accommodate new member states, foster international cooperation and operations, and address the growing awareness of non-state actor threats.’
Interestingly, there were several notable holdouts. Switzerland, prioritizing its longstanding policy of military neutrality and outside of NATO, retained military conscription. As did several Nordic countries, including Denmark, Finland, and Norway. Several factors motivated these nations in Northern Europe to maintain their practice of conscription. Finland was, until 2023, outside the NATO sphere of protection and shared a lengthy border with Russia. Denmark, a founding member of NATO, retained conscription partly as an ‘educational and civic tool.’
There are several notable differences among the Nordic states with respect to conscription models. For example, Finland employs a mandatory service model, in which all male citizens aged 18 and older are required to complete military or civil service, and women can volunteer for various forms of service, too. While Denmark recruits most of its soldiers as volunteers, the country also utilizes a lottery system to fill openings. Norway operates a selective compulsory service. This model applies to both men and women aged at least 19 and selects conscripts based on physical and psychological characteristics. Norway’s model is particularly competitive as well as lucrative, offering conscripts compensation during their service along with a payout upon its completion. Military service in the country is therefore considered a ‘stepping stone’ for a successful career.
Like Finland, Sweden joined NATO in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and, like Norway, has a selective compulsory service. (Sweden’s conscription service had been abolished but was reinstated in 2017, three years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea). Sweden’s conscription system has been described as a ‘total defense’ service. Every citizen between the ages of 16 and 70, regardless of gender, must complete either civilian or military service. As more citizens register for service than the military can accept, the armed services select conscripts based on rigorous requirements as well as their demonstrated interest in serving. This focus on conscription has elicited diverse reactions from Swedes, particularly among younger generations. Some have embraced the challenge and the opportunity to obtain fresh experience. Others view it as an impediment to their academic and professional careers.
Despite its mixed reception in Sweden, European countries seeking to strengthen their armed forces have taken notice of Sweden’s conscription model. In the spring of 2024, Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, visited Sweden and was impressed by the country’s conscription system, telling journalists in Stockholm:
‘We need young and well-motivated men and women to defend our countries if they are needed…I heard a lot about the Swedish approach and I appreciate it— your approach includes a strong reserve force and we have seen in Ukraine that this is important.’
Then, in June 2024, Pistorius proposed a new selective military service closely modeled on Sweden’s conscription system. The German system would require all men aged 18 to fill out a detailed questionnaire. From this approximately 40,000 would be selected to undergo a medical. Finally, a cohort of 10,000 would be enlisted and sent to basic training.
The Baltic States, all of which border Russian territory, have also reestablished mandatory military service. (The only exception is Estonia, which never abolished conscription). Lithuania reinstated conscription in 2015, just one year after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Latvia, which eliminated mandatory service in 2006, reintroduced it in 2023 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both Latvia and Lithuania use the aforementioned lottery system, though both countries offer enticements such as educational and employment opportunities to volunteers.
Just as the all-volunteer system spread eastward after the end of the Cold War, it will be interesting to see if the practice of conscription begins to filter westward. Since 1989, the military strength and spending of Western European countries has gradually diminished. However, with the changing geopolitical situation in Europe, policy makers are being forced to reconsider this trajectory. For the first time in decades, conscription is being seriously debated in the capital cities of Western European nations.
The United Kingdom is among the Western European nations which have entertained the idea of mandatory military service. The United Kingdom, which has entrusted military recruitment to the private firm Capita, has repeatedly missed its own recruitment goals in recent years. This prompted the former defense secretary, Ben Wallace, to suggest that the United Kingdom should move toward a Nordic model of conscription. This was followed by the country’s then prime minister, Rishi Sunak, proposing a return to mandatory national service as part of the Conservative Party’s 2024 general election manifesto. This scheme provided an option to either enroll in a yearlong military training program or participate in some form of civil service.
But what might be the challenges of a general return to conscription? The biggest obstacle is perhaps public opinion. Survey data suggests it may be difficult to sell conscription to the wider European population. A recent Gallup poll found that just 32% of EU citizens would be ‘willing to defend their country in the event of war.’ Broken down, the numbers reveal a clear East-West divergence. Consistent majorities of citizens from Western European nations (including strong majorities of young people) state that they would refuse to take up arms to defend their country if war broke out. Comparably, in Eastern and Northern European states, where conscription laws are already on the books and proximity to Russia is a factor, majorities or pluralities of respondents said they would defend their country.
Military conscription has numerous implications if enacted in a widespread manner in Europe. While it can increase troop numbers and shore up fragile defenses, critics question whether the short terms of military service could leave conscripts undertrained and underprepared, and thus a danger to themselves and others on the battlefield. Additionally, conscription could prove to be egregiously expensive. While it may seem cost-effective as opposed to the volunteer system, which requires considerable public investment, conscription could contribute to massive costs in lost production as young people are removed from the workforce or education. Finally, proponents of conscription argue that it contributes to ‘forging a shared national identity and fostering patriotic sentiment.’ Yet, research shows that this might ‘skew civic identity along military lines’, weakening the ‘citizen-state relationship’ and decreasing ‘trust in democratic institutions.’ In any case, it would be easier to tap into the presumed patriotism of volunteers rather than try to inculcate it among conscripts.
In general, the European countries in closest proximity to Russia have instituted military conscription. The systems of conscription exist in a patchwork, with different countries implementing different models and incentives. One new development common to many of these models is gender inclusivity. This reflects not only the pressing need for new recruits, as well as shifting societal roles for women. The reasons why countries have conscription are also diverse. While the threat posed by Russia is common to many, some, such as Denmark and Switzerland, have reasons that are particular to their own history and civic identity.
As military conscription has become a necessity in Eastern and Northern Europe, leaders in Western Europe have been tempted to reevaluate their own all-volunteer forces. While these armies remain highly professional, their relatively small size and the volatile geopolitical situation has prompted Western European nations to consider following in the footsteps of their easterly neighbors by implementing mandatory military service. However, significant hurdles must be overcome, not least public opinion, which is solidly against conscription. Ultimately, the future of military recruitment in Europe hinges not only on strategic necessities, but also on the ability of governments to engage their citizens in a constructive dialogue that balances security requirements with societal expectations and values.