European Central: Religious Divisions Afflict Ukraine In Its Fight With Russia

Wong Yu Liang

The history of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine is closely linked to the country’s political and cultural evolution. Its roots date back to the tenth century when Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv adopted Orthodox Christianity for his realm. Over the centuries, the church played a crucial role in preserving local identity, particularly after Ukraine was integrated into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. In the late seventeenth century, when a short-lived Ukrainian state formed as a result of a rebellion against Polish rule and was incorporated into the Russian state, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction known as the Metropolis of Kyiv was placed under the authority of the Patriarchate of Moscow. From then on, the church served to reinforce Russian political and cultural dominance in Ukraine.

The emergence of Ukrainian nationalism in the twentieth century sparked calls for ecclesiastical independence from Russia, leading some clerics to declare autocephaly (church autonomy) in the early 1920s. However, the Soviet era put an end to this movement. Despite its open hostility to religion, the Soviet Union supported the Russian Orthodox Church’s control over religious affairs in Ukraine as a means of maintaining influence over the country’s large and unwieldy population. After the Soviet Union collapsed, a split occurred within the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, with some clerics breaking away from Moscow while others remained loyal to the Russian Orthodox Church. As a result, Ukraine became home to two rival Orthodox Churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which has historical ties to the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which was founded in the 2010s.

The two Orthodox tendencies have diverged sharply over the years. The Maidan Revolution in February of 2014 set in motion the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Against the backdrop of broader geopolitical tensions, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church experienced a dramatic ideological shift in July of that year when its relatively moderate and inclusive patriarch, Volodymyr, passed away. He was succeeded by Onufrii, a staunch advocate of Putin’s expansive and imperialist ‘Russian World’ doctrine.

In 2018, Russia attempted to prevent the establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Bartholomew, the ecumenical patriarch of the worldwide church, ‘provided a formal letter (or “Tomos”) of approval of the church’s autocephaly on Orthodox Christmas Day in January 2019. The Kremlin, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Orthodox oligarchs pressured the other Orthodox churches not to recognise [sic] this.’ As of mid-2022, only a handful of churches around the world, including those in Greece, Cyprus, and Alexandria, have recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s religious landscape was further fragmented and transformed as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in 2022. Due to its close ties to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, once the largest religious denomination in the country, has grappled with ‘declining membership, public scrutiny and restrictive government policies.’ Prior to Russia’s invasion of the country, 40% of Ukrainian believers were members of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and 20% the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. A further 33% called themselves ‘just Orthodox.’ However, now the Orthodox Church of Ukraine claims the backing of 52% of Ukrainians, with the figure declaring ‘just Orthodox’ down to 11%, and supporters of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church at just 4%. An opinion poll in April of 2022 found that 74% of Ukrainians believed that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should cut its ties with Russia and 51% wanted the institution banned altogether.

Due to its declining significance and political pressure, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has made some efforts to ‘cut its ties with Russia and negotiate a modus vivendi with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.’ Hundreds of Ukrainian Orthodox Church priests have openly criticized Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for his ‘heretical’ position on the war in Ukraine. Moreover, approximately four hundred Ukrainian Orthodox Church parishes have left the church since the beginning of the invasion. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has also become more strident in its criticism of the war. Several months after the start of the invasion, a Sobor (bishops’ council) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church condemned ‘war as a violation of God’s commandment “Thou shalt not kill!”’ The Sobor also expressed ‘condolences to all those who suffered in the war,’ although it did not expressly blame Russia for these crimes. Unsurprisingly, its critics in Ukraine thought that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church did not go far enough in distancing itself from the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian parent church, conversely, was angered by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s attempt to find a middle path. In the summer of 2022, it retaliated by ‘annexing all three dioceses in Crimea to create a Metropolitanate of Crimea.’

Tensions reached new heights in December 2022, when President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukrainian security services had uncovered evidence of Ukrainian Orthodox Church priests and institutions ‘circulating anti-Ukrainian propaganda and providing material support to Russian forces.’ Zelenskyy further announced that measures would be taken to safeguard Ukraine’s ‘spiritual independence,’ including the introduction of legislation ‘to prohibit activities of Ukrainian religious organizations tied to religious groups in nations committing aggression against Ukraine.’ The Kremlin responded by labeling the Ukrainian government a cabal of ‘satanists’ who were ‘banning Christianity to curry favor with a secular, godless Europe.’ In October 2023, Ukraine’s parliament approved a first reading of the legislation that would permit the state to crackdown on religious organizations linked to hostile foreign actors. While the legislation faced criticism on grounds of violating religious freedom from some international NGOs, Ukraine’s supporters in the West ‘accepted the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government’s concerns regarding [the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s] ties to Russia.’

The legislation, which faced numerous political and procedural hurdles and was reintroduced in March 2024, was eventually adopted in late August 2024. The law formally bans religious organizations with links to Russia, namely the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The law ‘provides for a nine-month transition period during which the [Ukrainian Orthodox Church] must either merge with the [Orthodox Church of Ukraine] or find a convincing way to distance itself from Moscow. If not, there will be a court decision formally banning the [Ukrainian Orthodox Church] that will mean it is deregistered, deprived of the right to own property, and stopped from conducting religious activities.’

The law marks the denouement of the schism within the Orthodox Church in Ukraine over the last decade or more. While the divisions between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine certainly predate Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country, the war has nevertheless ‘dramatically reduced the space for dialogue and compromise.’ Any hope of reconciliation or rapprochement between the two branches has been thoroughly dashed by the conflict. Ultimately, the war in Ukraine demonstrates how difficult it can be for countries enmeshed in conflict to uphold liberal principles such as religious freedom and tolerance.