European Central: Europe’s Shifting Energy Policies Vis-à-vis Russia

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One of the downstream effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the sudden realization on the part of many Europeans that they could no longer take the security and reliability of their energy supply for granted. Prior to the invasion, the ‘assumption had been that Europe and Russia were locked into a mutually beneficial, secure relationship, since Europe needed gas and Russia had no infrastructure to sell that gas anywhere else.’ This assumption proved to be incorrect.

When the invasion commenced, European nations were ‘importing a variety of energy products from Russia, including crude oil and oil products, uranium products, coal, and liquefied natural gas (LNG).’ However, Russia’s most potent energy tool was natural gas, which was supplied to the rest of the continent through pipelines by the state-controlled gas monopoly, Gazprom. European countries were heavily reliant on Russian natural gas, using it for ‘power generation, household heating, and industrial processes.’ Before February 2022, approximately 40% of Europe’s natural gas was imported from Russia, its largest supplier, through four main pipelines. Among European countries, Germany was the single largest recipient of Russian natural gas by volume, with more than half of its natural gas coming from Russia alone on the eve of the war.

In May 2022, several months after the start of the war, Russia began to eliminate gas supply to Europe. These measures were particularly disruptive, with many European countries struggling to cope with the immediate reduction of such a large volume of natural gas. As a result, energy bills quickly increased and many European governments were compelled to introduce emergency packages to aid struggling people and businesses. European governments were moreover forced to reduce their dependence on Russian gas and search for alternative suppliers and markets.

The narrative of Europe’s response to its primary natural gas supplier cutting off the flow is often framed in heroic terms—the continent finding new energy sources, conserving or substituting forms of energy to endure the crisis, and undermining Russia’s weaponization of energy by reducing the country’s natural gas revenues. While this narrative holds some degree of truth, it does not tell the whole story.

It turns out that not all European countries have distanced themselves from Russian natural gas in the three years since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Three countries—Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia—have continued to import large amounts of natural gas from Russia. Hungary imports most of its natural gas from Russia via the TurkStream pipeline. Slovakia also remains heavily reliant on natural gas imports from Russia, with Prime Minister Robert Fico maintaining a strong relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Fico has previously threatened to cut off electricity to Ukraine in retaliation if the beleaguered country moved to eliminate gas transit deals that facilitated the flow of Russian natural gas across its borders. Meanwhile, Austria has begun seeking alternative energy suppliers in recent months. In December 2024, Austrian energy company OMV announced that it had severed its contracts with Gazprom and was now ‘well-positioned’ with new energy sources.

However, Europe’s ‘Russia friendly’ countries have not been alone in importing energy—either directly or indirectly—from Russia. Italy, which on paper took significant steps to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas in the wake of the invasion, began indirectly importing Russian energy from Austria. In this respect, Italy is far from alone. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen ‘has made deals to import gas from Azerbaijan—despite parts of the critical infrastructure needed to transport this gas to the EU being owned by Lukoil, a Russian energy company on the US sanctions list. To meet the EU’s increased gas demands, Azerbaijan in turn made a deal with Russia to increase imports to meet Azerbaijani domestic demand.’ In effect, ‘Russian gas [has been] laundered through Azerbaijan…[as well as Turkey] to meet continued high European demands.’

Europe has been caught in an unenviable position, having to balance domestic energy requirements with foreign policy objectives. On one hand, the domestic political and economic reality is such that ‘it is extremely difficult for European countries to fully diversify their energy supplies, when many are already struggling with high inflation and a cost-of-living crisis.’ On the other, the ‘EU’s foreign policy objectives are focused on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine by making it as difficult as possible for Russia to continue to finance it. This includes through profits generated from its energy industry, whether through state subsidiaries or taxes paid to the Russian state.’ Thus, with its domestic energy security requirements and foreign policy in conflict with each other, the European Union is caught in a ‘catch-22.’

The way out of this trap is for the EU to ensure its complete energy independence from Russia. The longer EU countries rely on Russian natural gas, ‘the longer Russia has leverage over the EU.’ However, as Chatham House has reported, this would require the EU to develop a sophisticated and dynamic energy security policy. This could include a full embargo on Russian natural gas and LNG, which some experts have speculated would be minimally disruptive at this point in time. For this plan to succeed, European countries still dependent on Russian energy would have to completely diversify their imports. (Here, Austria could serve as an example for others to follow.) The next step would be for Europe to ‘ensure diversity of supply.’ This would require Europe to look farther afield—to Africa, the Middle East, and North America—for suppliers. Doing so would allow Europe to not be so reliant on just one source of energy, as it was with Russia. Ultimately, Europe’s struggle for energy independence from Russia confirms the increasing importance of energy concerns in shaping global geopolitics.