A Moment (Un)Like This: Morals, Meaning, and Recent Events
Jonathan Knowles
“A system such as democracy cannot be identified simply with external forms. It is not a set of fit rules to which one can adhere blindly. It is part of a wider social structure, arising out of its problems. It is therefore necessary to realize that it must alter with changing circumstances. Today the great problems demanding solution are to bring democratic societies into relation with the issues presented by a giant technology, by the concentration of economic power, and of state authority, and by the existence of poverty, disease and ignorance. In this sense, the issues of democracy remain alive and require more than the repetition of old rallying cries.” – Solomon Asch
As far back as I can remember, I have been intellectually curious. Whether it was trying to find alternative methods to solving math problems in primary school to rigorously applying philosophical ideas to real-world phenomena as an undergraduate, I was intrinsically motivated to try to understand a phenomenon’s constituent features.
What makes a given thing “tick” and why is it that this makes said thing tick but not that? The same can be said about my approach to my Christian faith, as one of the most influential periods in my faith journey occurred during the same semester I was in a graduate seminar reading Social Psychology, the book from which the opening quote was taken.
To this day what transpired is hard to fully describe; all I can say is that in some really meaningful ways, my faith was strengthened as I started seeing (what I perceived to be) connections between many of Asch’s ideas and Jesus’ ministry. With respect to the following essay, the connections most relevant encompass the following themes: the centrality of reasoning in human existence, the complexities of doing life together, and the importance of trying—to the best we know-how and are able—to understand why this may make a person a tick in a given situation instead of that.
Looking back, these themes were probably at work when I decided to do a ride-along with a police department a few years back, as I was trying to make sense of the tensions, conversations, and personal reactions taking place surrounding the police killings of Walter Scott, Alton Sterling, and Philando Castile to name a few; with the latter two occurring on back-to-back days.
Jonathan Knowles
How We Understand the Features of Unambiguously Moral Events
As I have been grappling with varying thoughts and emotions trying to make sense of the massive protests and other acts of civil disobedience, I have been thinking a lot about these themes and how collectively they may offer a lens through which to make sense of this moment.
And to be clear, the “moment” I am referring to refers exclusively to the actions performed by others that are rooted in a moral (justice) claim in response to moral violations (e.g., citizens dying at the hands of police). It appears that on multiple occasions, groups with different motives have decided to get in on the action.
Therefore, the following focuses on the former and not the latter. And although I do not support rioting, vandalism, or the destruction of people’s property, insofar as these actions have taken place, I believe it is crucial for us to care enough to want to understand why these things are happening in the first place.
One of the things that have helped me make sense of this moment is the belief that given the primacy of COVID-19 and the economic fallout in the national discourse, there must be a really important reason for so many people—both locally, nationally, and globally—to protest injustice.
Although at the start of the protests I had (and still have) serious concerns about the COVID-19 implications of recent events, I think it will be a mistake, without evidence indicating otherwise, to characterize those who were social distancing prior to the protests but are now active participants as highly emotional, irrational, and/or hypocritical.
In line with the view of Turiel and colleagues that our moral reasoning is often intimately tied to—but not determined by—our emotional reactions to events, I think it is reasonable (no pun intended) to assume that a primary motivating factor in their decisions to protest is cognitive in nature, connected to their evaluation of what they deem to be relevant events and the features of those events.
Jonathan Knowles
For decades, Turiel and colleagues have sought to understand the features that tend to distinguish acts that are understood as (im)moral from acts that are not, and ways we tend to cognitively represent these features in contrast to the features of nonmoral acts. Three of these features include intentionally harming an innocent person, the consequences of the harm to the victim, and the belief that the permissibility or prohibition of the act is not bound (or determined) by whether the act is sanctioned by societal norms, laws, or expectations.
Moreover, research in this area has consistently found that when presenting people with hypothetical situations involving unambiguous harm (e.g., one person intentionally harming an innocent or defenseless person), people overwhelmingly evaluate said harm negatively, and believe their evaluations are not dependent upon authority sanctions, laws or rules. These findings have been found amongst various age groups (children, adolescents, and adults) and across various countries across the world.
Although admittedly I have not seen the George Floyd video (I could not bring myself to watch it and I am not sure if I will), from what I’ve read about the incident it appears it was an unambiguous act of intentional and excessive harm against a defenseless person who—regardless of the suspected crime—should be assumed innocent until proven otherwise by a court of his peers. Human dignity, along with U.S. law, dictates as much.
If decades of research attesting to the primacy of people’s moral prescriptions regarding the preservation of life are not enough, then in this politically-polarizing climate, maybe the apparent bipartisan agreement on the immoral and inhumane nature of the act should be. And consistent with the abovementioned research, the widespread agreement in the reactions to the video suggests that the perpetrator’s authority as a state-sanctioned agent does not justify his treatment of the victim.
Jonathan Knowles
How We Are Able to Conceptually Alter the Meaning of Events
If we accept the belief that humans are largely reasoning beings whose cognitive capacities are related to—but not determined by their emotional reactions to events—then I think it is easier to understand why there would be so many protests and acts of civil disobedience in the midst of a pandemic and robust economic hardship.
Even so, there is a numbers-related argument that some individuals have pointed out that I believe, on balance, raises legitimate concerns that need to be addressed. In general, the argument questions the reasoning or validity behind such a widespread reaction to the relatively few police killings of African Americans when (1) police officers kill more non-African American citizens than African American citizens and (2) African American citizens kill more African American citizens than the police do.
While these phenomena undoubtedly need to be addressed, I think the path to seriously doing so is sometimes obscured by failing to account for an important psychological reality; one tied to the complexities of social life.
Research suggests that in many areas of life (whether right or wrong), we make evaluative decisions based largely on qualitative criteria instead of quantitative criteria. One implication from the numbers-related argument—at least as I understand it—is that decisions about acts with moral features or consequences should be based largely or solely on quantitative criteria (i.e., an act that occurs more often should weigh the heaviest in our decision-making process).
However, research conducted throughout the last few decades suggests that children, adolescents, and adults do not treat every morally-relevant act the same, and their distinctions between these acts may relate their attribution of different meanings to the events.
Jonathan Knowles
Two broad sets of findings support this point. One set pertains to the different evaluations and justifications people bring to bear when responding to abstract or unambiguous situations (e.g., situations that only involve a potential moral violation) versus contextualized or ambiguous situations (e.g., situations that involve potential moral and nonmoral components).
In general, findings from this set suggests that the presence of both moral and nonmoral components within a given event can potentially alter the meaning of that event in the minds of those experiencing or responding to it. The second set pertains to the different evaluations and justifications people bring to bear when responding to morally-relevant acts that differ based on the specific beliefs held by those involved (e.g., about reality, the purpose of the act, etc.).
For the second set, findings generally indicate that morally-relevant acts that are based on non-moral beliefs (e.g., the belief that spanking a child as a form of punishment is in their best long-term interest) are viewed differently than morally-relevant acts based on moral beliefs (e.g., the belief that is alright to spank children even if they did nothing wrong).
When we reflect on our own social experiences and relationships, the essence of these findings may seem to have some practical validity.
For example, have you ever been in an argument or disagreement with someone over an issue that was resolved once it was discovered that you and/or the other person were operating with different information pertaining to the issue? Have you ever based your initial impression of an individual based on inaccurate or incomplete information and then altered your impression once you acquired more complete/accurate information?
Jonathan Knowles
We can also probably point to examples in our lives where our reaction to an event was largely based on qualitative criteria instead of quantitative criteria. For instance, when people feel disrespected by, lied to, or betrayed by people close to them, it does not seem obvious to me that the primary response to the act should be based on a quantitative comparison; although in some cases this may very well be the case.
To me, it seems more common that at least initially, the response to such an act would stem largely from a qualitative comparison. For instance, given that relationships of care (e.g., friendships, family relationships, etc.) are often based on expectations of respect, fidelity, and preservation of well-being, etc., it seems reasonable that the impact of one instance of violating one of these expectations may be understood differently by the offended party than the multiple instances of when the said expectation was met.
In other words, consistent with Turiel and colleagues, there are many areas in our daily lives where our actions and reactions may reflect our ability as humans to conceptually alter the meaning of events depending on certain information, beliefs, and other factors. It is possible, I believe, that this may be the case for at least some of the protesters and citizens engaged in civil disobedience.
And also relevant to current events and mentioned elsewhere, this ability to conceptually alter the meaning of events is further suggested by investigations of the relationship between group norms and our evaluations of political activities and policies.
Jonathan Knowles
Where I Hope this Moment is Going
“…we have attempted to show that the study of structural interrelations is the necessary condition of social understanding….In particular, we have seen that the content [i.e., character, meaning] of issues and principles changes with historical circumstances [e.g., changes in notions of equality and freedom].
A datum is not the same thing in different contexts; it becomes the same only when divorced from its surroundings. Unless we recognize this property of facts we become…dogmatic in our social thinking and exposed to serious errors.” – Solomon Asch
I am not claiming or assuming that the psychological features of social life discussed above constitute the best explanation of the recent protests and acts of civil disobedience. But I do believe that decades of research on socio-moral development suggests that it is at least reasonable to ask if one or more of these features may be playing some role, given the apparent salience of these features in ways we evaluate and understand morally-relevant events.
Moreover, I believe that sincerely asking the question has the potential to stimulate productive dialogue about the true nature of the problems we face, move us closer towards the creation and implementation of more human and effective policies, and inspire us to value our lives together—despite our differences—in such a way that makes for a stronger and more humane society. A society we are more than capable of creating.
-Justin Martin is a Professor of Psychology at Whitworth University-
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of Modern Treatise.