Caribbean Review: Pinning the Problem of Gangs in Port-au-Prince

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On Wednesday December 11, 2024, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that it will be halting commercial flights to Port-au-Prince and designated areas within Haiti. The decision resulted from grave concerns about the security environment surrounding the Toussaint Louverture International Airport after three American planes were struck with bullets. The ban of low-altitude operations will last until March 2025.

The gunfire that struck these planes resulted from the dozens of gangs who control approximately 85% of the territory within Port-au-Prince, causing a deteriorating security apparatus. The violence and fear mongering perpetuated by frequent clashes between police forces and gangs have created an environment of instability and terror for the Haitian people. 

Producing a cataclysmic environment, the gangs have forced 700,000 people from their homes and have plunged half the population of Haiti into starvation. As things continue to devolve, the intersection of social, economic, security and humanitarian failures has impacted daily life in Haiti in almost every way possible. A situation where children do not feel safe going to school, businesses operate with the constant fear of being looted, residents restricted in their movement and the fear of an attack at any moment encapsulates the chaotic situation in Port-au-Prince and Haiti at-large. 

The gangs have centralized their coalitions in the capital city Port-au-Prince due to the vast amounts of aid and resources there. Just two years ago, the leader of the G-9 gang coalition, Jimmy “Barbeque” Cherizier, seized control of the nation’s main oil terminal, effectively grinding the entire nation to a damaging halt. As Haiti is a solely oil-reliant country, blocking access of delivery trucks and oil tanker ships brought the economy to its knees demonstrating the power of the gangs. 

To understand the reasons why gangs in Haiti run the nation and are threatening to collapse the state of Haiti, there are a multitude of factors at play. Ultimately, a combination of public distrust of governmental institutions, distaste for foreign interference and a failing economy have made the quality of life in Haiti “horrible” according to Dr. Robert Fatton, Emeritus Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. 

Consistent with the aforementioned crumbling state of affairs in Haiti, the MSF, Medecins Sans Frontieres, a humanitarian organization, has decided to institute a temporary suspension of operations in Port-au-Prince. After one of their ambulances was ravaged, their healthcare workers kidnapped and their patients killed in November, Jean-Marc Biquet, Head of Mission in Haiti explained that repeated threats to MSF staff caused the group of doctors to halt treatment of Haitians. 

Some punditry, like that of Editor Kim Ives of the Haitian Times, highlight the undemocratic transitional government in Haiti that has led to the neglect of necessary Haitian security institutions. The nine-person Presidential Council is meant to be representative of multiple interest groups across the country and is tasked with organizing elections ahead of the UN mandated national elections in 2026, a decade after the last held in 2016. Yet, the Council has faced significant infighting and, characteristic of recent Haitian politics, allegations of corruption and bribery have undermined the legitimacy of the Council. 

In an effort to support this Presidential Council, the UN Security Council dispatched the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) staffed by a majority of Kenyan security forces to stabilize the country’s security sphere in hopes of returning effective governance to Haiti. Yet, despite the initial pledge by President William Ruto of Kenya of about 1000 personnel to the mission, only about 400 have been sent so far. With limited supplies, funding and capabilities, the effectiveness of the MSS has been touted as a surprising success by Commander Godfrey Otunge. But, with the limited resources he has, critical chokepoints in the capital such as airports, shipping ports and the main oil terminal may have been secured but operational capabilities limit his capacity to launch offensive insurgency campaigns against the gangs to erase them as a threat. 

Yet, even as the Kenyans under the MSS mandate continue to make incremental progress, their forces are miniscule compared to the widespread gang-laden environment. The presence of the Kenyan patrols initially met with jubilance and relief felt by residents like Johanne Celestin, have currently garnered skepticism and sourness about their effectiveness in repelling and deterring the gangs because of their little effect in improving the state of affairs in Haiti.

Invoking the colonial history of Haiti, residents harbor an innate sense of suspicion in regards to foreign intervention. As a former French colony in the 1700s, the Haitian people famously secured their independence through the Haitian Revolution of 1804. Yet, for fear that the model slave revolt could serve to inspire slaves in other countries at the time, the U.S. and France acted to strangle the influence that the nascent Haiti could command. In doing so, France levied a 150 million franc fee for Haiti to secure their independence which crippled the young nation’s finances. A modern-day equivalent of 20-30 Billion USD.

Likewise, the interventionist crusading of the rising imperial power of the United States in the early 20th century caused further political damage and planted the seed of public distrust of government. After the U.S. manipulated the 1915 Haitian elections to elect a pro-American President and strong-arming the Haitian legislature to adopt a new Constitution allowing for foreign land ownership, it is clear to see the overwhelming negative perspective of the Haitian people towards the prospects of foreign assistance and intervention. 

Yet, to combat the gangs, multiple Transitional Council Presidents of Haiti including Leslie Voltaire, Gary Conille and Edgar LeBlanc Fils have resorted to impassioned requests for international help in the form of aid, the reauthorization of the MSS and for increased financial assistance to return order to Haiti. Efforts seemingly welcomed by Haitians exhausted by instability, violence and a corrupt state. 

With the continued presence of gangs, the historical roots of distrust and rampant corruption that plagues each attempt to amend the Haitian social contract seems to meet a cursed state of affairs. A near collapsing state, Haitians have repeated the call that a solution must come from within but the question remains, “Is Haiti able to govern again?”