China View: Beijing’s Efforts To Solve Its Soldier Slump
Military development and expansion play a pivotal role in China’s regional and global defense strategy. Since taking office in 2012, President Xi Jinping has prioritized accelerating efforts to expand China’s military capacity and modernize the capabilities of the country’s armed forces. Under Xi’s administration, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone significant restructuring with focuses on technological development. This is particularly apparent in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which has become one of the most powerful naval forces in the world. With rising tensions around the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Sino-Indian border, Beijing’s military defense capacity is vital to its national security.
However, in recent years the country is struggling to attract enough technologically skilled recruits to operate its modern weaponry, including aircraft carriers and naval warships. There is a rising lack of interest in joining the PLA due to the presence of higher paying jobs as well as the restrictions of military life. For example, soldiers are given limited internet access to prevent potential security breaches from video games, file-sharing websites, and emails. Declining recruitment is also a consequence of the government’s efforts to curb population growth through the One-Child Policy. The government has tried to entice potential recruits in many ways including promoting military-themed movies, offering preferential access to state-sector jobs, and improving veteran benefits. However, the PLA continues to experience limited success in improving military enlistment.
“By their own admission, the [PLA] military continues to struggle to attract and retain educated and skilled people who can use the weapons and equipment,”
-Dr. Timothy Heath, Senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation
The PLA has undergone dramatic changes since its first push for modernization in the 1980s and 1990s. This modernization involved the development of more advanced equipment and a clearer organizational structure. China’s military expenditure over the last decade has stayed at around 1.7% of its gross domestic product (GDP) with 1.55 trillion yuan ($224 billion) allocated to military spending in 2023. Under Xi Jinping, the PLA has undergone a period of optimization in which the size of the army decreased from 3.46 million in 2010 to 3.21 million in 2020. The focus over the last decade has been to downsize and modernize the PLA to boost its efficiency. How will reducing PLA forces impact the country’s capacity to manage global and domestic military operations?
The country also began to diversify its military spending by allocating more resources towards other branches such as the PLAN, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). These forces are vital in providing the PLA with the ability to modernize and expand its military capabilities. However, the absence of eligible recruits and narrow interests in joining the PLA has hampered the coordination and effectiveness of military operations. While the PLA’s capabilities and arsenal are robust, China has struggled to raise recruitment figures to serve in the modern military landscape.
In June of 2018, the annual National Conscription Work Video Conference was held. It set new national priorities such as attracting “higher caliber” personnel and increasing recruits for the navy and the air force. Since 2001, the PLA has been aiming to reduce the number of recruits from high school and increase college student enlistment, specifically graduates with STEM skills relating to mathematics, communications, and engineering.
These efforts achieved some success with the number of college graduates increasing from 38,000 in 2008 to approximately 150,000 in 2014. However, high school students continue to comprise a significant share of the recruits and the PLA is struggling to attract enough technologically skilled recruits to operate its modern weaponry. Part of the problem of recruiting college graduates is the prevalence of more lucrative private and public sector jobs.
In December of 2023, the PLA’s official newspaper stated that the navy did not have enough fully trained personnel to operate all of its new warships and combat jets. In an effort to attract recruits, they have changed promotions, recruitment, and training of soldiers. The government has also passed laws to provide living allowances, employment, as well as educational and healthcare services for PLA veterans. To boost the number of recruits and college graduate enlistment, the conscription cycle was changed from once-a-year to twice-a-year.
While conscription, mandatory enlistment in military service, still exists under China’s Military Service Law, it has been rarely enforced by the authorities. “Roughly 700,000 personnel out of the PLA’s 2 million strong active-duty force are conscripts”. Although conscripts are the least trained, they still play a vital role in ground combat operations and in select technical missions. China is also recruiting non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to boost the quality of its troops and improve the employment of graduates. NCOs are given the same benefits as first-year conscripts such as subsidies, fares, medical support, and insurance.
Beijing has introduced more flexible requirements to encourage enlistment. The age limit for postgraduate students has been lifted from 24 to 26. The retirement age for top commanders was also raised from 55 to 60 to retain skilled professionals longer. Additionally, the PLA has “eased physical standards, removed exclusions banning people with mental illnesses and promised ramped up entertainment facilities for soldiers”. The PLA pledged to increase its budget on jukeboxes, musical instruments and other entertainment for the soldiers. Military pay has also improved. Average annual salaries rose from 5,373 yuan ($826) in 2010 to around 12,000 yuan ($1,640) in 2023.
China's rapidly growing military has added staggering numbers of ships and aircrafts making the country’s armed forces the second-largest military in the world. However, the PLA’s inability to recruit and retain qualified personnel is hampering military development and modernization. In addition to lower salaries compared to the private sector jobs, potential recruits often find military life too restrictive. The PLA severely limits internet access and marriages must be approved by supervisors. The recent changes to enlistment requirements and service benefits have been marginally successfully in garnering interest from prospective recruits.
Between 2010 and 2020, the proportion of PLA personnel with higher education had increased to approximately 57%. While this displays some progress, this figure is well below the PLA’s target of around 70%. Some have argued that the new incentives and benefits are perpetuating this enlistment problem. While incentives such as educational subsidies and preferential access to state-sector jobs attracted more students, many quit the military as soon as they qualified for these benefits. While recent PLA recruits are not publicly available, it is expected that China’s current economic slowdown and narrow job market will push more graduates to consider military service.
