China View: China Fires Back at Hong Kong
Simon Jankowski/NurPhoto
Hong Kongers have long pursued their quest towards self-identification as a unitary community and nation. While this desire has become increasingly popular due to the recent 2019-2020 protests, however, the reality of it dates back to 1842, when Hong Kong was first ceded to the British Empire following the First Opium War.
If we were to explain the long geopolitical contention suffered by Hong Kong since then in simple terms, the situation could be easily compared to a cricket match - albeit a two-century one. China and Great Britain being the participants, while Hong Kong was the ball.
The side of the story portraying Hong Kong protesters as victims of a strict Chinese regime has been largely covered by foreign and local media advocating human rights and supporting their pro-democratic movement, but it is also true the other side of the coin has always been silenced or given the uncomfortable etiquette of “assertive authoritarian government.” What are the real reasons China deeply opposes Hong Kong’s strive for independence?
The Central Government of the People’s Republic of China has long been worried that independence movements in Hong Kong were not at all “pro-democratic.” In fact, the socio-economic structure of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has a history of being heavily reliant on the wallets of local tycoons. These are families holding Hong Kong’s destiny in their palms, occupying unassailably the list of Asia’s richest people. While many of the failures regarding the local job market, making unemployment rise significantly, have often fuelled protests against the Chinese Government, it is likely tycoons are far more directly involved in these, considering most of the economy is controlled by them. It is understandable, then, why the Mainland cannot allow Hong Kong to gain independence: this would mean to give consent to an oligarchic political structure that might be even less orthodox or transparent in the measures they would use to govern Hong Kong.
In an interview conducted by American news channel CNBC, Shanghai-based economist Andy Xie emphasizes the importance of addressing the problematic political structure in Hong Kong. While Hong Kong has often regarded Singapore as a sort of city-state example, Dr. Xie claims the latter is steps ahead compared to the Special Administrative Region. The claws of tycoons might be far too deeply rooted in Hong Kong political dynamics, he believes, and Beijing might accountable too for allowing them to retain such power. Andy Xie was, after all, one of the enlightened experts to predict the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, therefore there is no doubt his valuable contributions will be taken into consideration by the Central Government.
CNBC Interview with economist Andy Xie on the issue of tycoons in Hong Kong. (Credit: CNBC)
Most importantly, if China agreed to grant autonomous rights to Hong Kong, there is a high risk this would have a domino effect on other disputed areas the PRC openly claims as theirs. Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, or Macau would surely attempt to make a similar move due to various ideological, religious, and cultural differences that distinguish them from Mainland China. Change seems to be happening already in Taiwan, where public discontent due to the Chinese suppression of Hong Kong protests escalated in the re-election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader, President Tsai Ing-Wen, in January 2020.
The support Hong Kong protesters have received over time, not only comes from Taiwan but also from economic powers like the US and the UK, which have put the Chinese government in an increasingly distressing situation. Hence, China could have only responded by using its most efficient weapon: the law. China announced it would impose National Security Law on Hong Kong to enforce “harmony.” Harmony is one of the preferred ideals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which feels threatened by disorder and demands serenity within the Chinese community.
With the cooperation of city leader Carrie Lam, the National Security Law would punish secession, subversion, any other act of violence or intimidation towards other people, and any support towards foreign forces willing to interfere with China’s sovereignty in the region. Lam claims that foreign governments commenting on this matter “have been adopting blatant double standards,” and “it is within the legitimate jurisdiction of any country to enact laws and safeguard national security,” she said on June 3rd 2020 at a press conference in Beijing.
Public opinion in Hong Kong appears torn on welcoming these regulations. One side of the argument believes that protests have encouraged the economic recession Hong Kong is facing, and that the National Security Law is necessary to avoid a further escalation of these into dangerous civil conflicts. The other side, mostly liberal, believes this policy will impose serious limits the population of Hong Kong cannot accept. This might be linked to its British past, which has certainly instilled important knowledge on rights awareness in the people’s sense of community. Chinese Mainlanders are, from this point of view, extremely different in the way they perceive the role of authority in their lives.
It is clear, anyway, that the Chinese government will not allow public opinion to undermine its power and, the more protesters will choose not to cooperate, the tighter Beijing is going to hold its grip. While a cold war continues between Chinese and foreign media, hoping to sanction CTGN and other State-run sources for allegedly omitting coverage on the latest protests of May 2020, Xi Jinping’s government is not to appear as concerned from external pressures.
While one can understand the desires of the Hong Kong community to pursue the legacy of a hybrid heritage that is neatly different from that of Mainland Chinese, it is unlikely that change will occur in the near future. The Singaporean model is surely an example Hong Kongers wish to follow, however, the domestic issues that must be adjusted both regionally and nationally to fit the Singaporean standards are more likely to be addressed thoroughly in the long-run.
