European Central: Elections in Georgia Prompt Swift Backlash

Reuters 

On October 26, 2024, Georgia, a strategically vital mountainous republic in the Caucasus region, held its parliamentary elections. The governing Euroskeptic and pro-Russia Georgian Dream (GD) party sought a fourth consecutive term in government. It was challenged by several different pro-European coalitions, including Coalition for Change, Unity – National Movement, Strong Georgia, and For Georgia. The Election Administration of Georgia announced on election night that GD had won the election with approximately 54% of the vote and secured 89 out of 150 seats in parliament. The four opposition coalitions, which agreed through their ‘Georgian Charter’ to not cooperate with the GD in parliament, secured a combined 38% of the vote and 61 seats.

The results ignited a firestorm of controversy. Several factions within the country’s fractured opposition quickly declared that they did not recognize the election results to be legitimate and called for Georgians to take to the streets. Indeed, the opposition parties had already claimed victory before the results were announced, pointing to the findings of two exit polls commissioned by media outlets sympathetic to their cause. These exit polls predicted that, combined, the opposition should secure a parliamentary majority.

This response echoed the aftermath of the previous parliamentary elections in 2020, when the opposition refused to acknowledge the results and boycotted parliamentary sessions for over five months. The crisis was eventually resolved through negotiations with GD and the opposition, mediated by the European Union. The situation this time, however, is much more precarious, as GD has pledged to use its victory to outlaw its opponents and other groups aligned with Western interests.

While the opposition parties were quick in their response, so was GD. Shortly after the polls closed, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire founder and unofficial leader of GD, as well as Georgia’s former prime minister, declared victory. He heralded the election as ‘a rare case in the world that the same party would achieve such results for 12 years in such challenging circumstances.’  Following his speech, fireworks erupted, and cars emblazoned with the GD insignia drove through Tbilisi, honking their horns in exuberant celebration. Despite its success, GD fell short of a parliamentary supermajority, hindering its ability to make illiberal alterations to the country’s constitution, including promised anti-LGBTQ measures.  

In the days following GD’s apparent victory in Georgia’s parliamentary elections, attention shifted to allegations of fraud. The Georgian election-monitoring organization, My Vote, reported discovering a ‘scheme of large-scale election fraud’ involving a complex set of measures designed to circumvent the verification process and enable an organized ‘carousel’ of multiple voting to occur. Statisticians analyzing the results have also identified irregularities suggesting ‘widespread tampering in favour of the government [GD].’ While Georgian elections have never been entirely free from controversy, if these allegations are confirmed, it would represent a new level of electoral malpractice. However, no definitive evidence has emerged so far.

On October 28, tens of thousands of Georgians took to the streets after President Salome Zurabishvili, a close ally of the opposition, alleged that GD employed Russian-style tactics in the elections. Demonstrators convened at the parliament building in Tbilisi, where Zurabishvili told them: ‘You did not lose the election…They stole your vote and tried to steal your future, but no one has the right to do that, and you will not let anyone do that!’ She promised to defend Georgia’s path toward Europe: ‘We have no alternative and nothing else we want to leave this country for the next generations,’ she said. She argued that the official results were evidence of a ‘Russian special operation – one of the new forms of hybrid warfare carried out on our people, our country.’ However, she later clarified that she was not directly accusing Russia of vote tampering but pointing to the sophisticated fraud methods resembling those used by the Russian security services. She also criticized GD for its ties to Moscow, citing Russian messages of support after the election and the passage of a controversial ‘foreign influence’ law similar to Russia’s own ‘foreign agent law.’

In response, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze accused Zurabishvili and the opposition of trying to destabilize the country and refusing to accept defeat. He also defended the government’s commitment to European integration despite fears that the election could damage Georgia’s relations with the West and signal a shift toward Moscow.

The opposition coalitions in Georgia remain skeptical. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, GD has shifted the country away from its pro-Western orientation, adopting a neutral stance on the war and veering toward authoritarianism, including cracking down on protesters. Despite securing EU candidate status in December of 2023, the government has repeatedly undermined its own progress by frequently criticizing the West, leading to suspended accession negotiations. The opposition parties view these developments as representing a pivot toward Russia. As a result, they framed the election as a choice between Europe and Russia. Interestingly, GD framed the election as a similar choice, warning of a Western plot to drag the country into a destructive war with Russia in their ‘No War, Choose Peace’ campaign slogan. This message, which exploited Georgians’ security concerns and the memory of the country’s brutal war with Russia in 2008, still alive in the memories of most people, resonated with many voters.

So, what does the future hold for Georgia? The pro-European opposition parties must regroup and develop a message that connects with the people of Georgia. The Georgian Dream-led government made one of its first moves by hosting Hungary’s right-wing populist prime minister, Viktor Orbán, in Tbilisi. This was indicative of the direction Georgia may take: ‘still formally tied to the West, but nevertheless trying to play all sides.’