European Central: Corruption Blocks Western Balkans’ EU Entry

At the 1993 summit in Copenhagen, Denmark, the European Council established criteria that all countries seeking to join the European Union must meet in order to be eligible for membership. Among the requirements set forth were: stability of democratic institutions, protection of human rights and minority groups, administrative and institutional capacity to successfully enact the acquis (body of EU laws that is binding on all EU member states), and respect for the rule of law.

Over the past thirty years, many countries that were once part of the Eastern Bloc have met the criteria for EU membership, leading to the gradual eastward expansion of the EU. However, not all former communist states have joined the EU. Notably, the countries of the Western Balkans – formerly part of Yugoslavia – have remained outside the EU’s direct sphere of influence.

Despite beginning their EU accession applications in the mid-2000s, most Western Balkan countries remain in ‘candidate’ status, with the notable exception of Croatia, which became a member in 2013 after an arduous application process. Several factors have contributed to this delay, chief among them the pervasive challenges of state capture and entrenched corruption within the region.

State capture and corruption are not ‘a priori incompatible with the EU.’ Indeed, ‘corruption and the subjugation of public institutions to personal or group interests are pretty common phenomena’ in post-communist states seeking EU accession. In the Western Balkans, political leaders have had to ‘build, maintain, and support their and their party’s clientele through public sector employment, subsidies, and other material benefits.’ These corrupt practices have proven essential for both consolidating power and competing for it in a region marked by deep-rooted ethnic and sectarian divisions. However, the scale of state capture in the Western Balkans poses a clear threat to any future EU governance in the region. As a result, the EU has been reluctant to approve membership applications from most Western Balkan countries, leading to the indefinite prolongation of their accession to the European Union.

To understand the scope of the state capture crisis in the Western Balkans, it is important to consider several recent corruption scandals that have afflicted just one country: Albania. Along with other Western Balkan nations, Albania was identified as a potential candidate for EU membership in 2003. In 2009, the country submitted its formal application for membership and was granted candidate status in 2014. Since then, however, Albania has been mired in protracted negotiations with the EU, with its inability to tackle political corruption a significant factor behind the country’s delayed accession.

Corruption has infiltrated every level of Albania’s political system. On October 25, 2024, Albania’s Special Structure Against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) filed corruption charges against Plarent Ndreca MP of the ruling Socialists ‘following an investigation into four procurement processes for construction work in police stations carried out while he was working at the Interior Ministry.’ Ndreca only became an MP in January 2024, succeeding Arben Ahmetaj, the former deputy prime minister who fled to Switzerland after ‘being charged in Albania with corruption and money laundering.’

Opposition leaders in Albania have also been charged with corruption. On October 21, 2024, Ilir Meta, who served as Albania’s president from 2017 to 2022, and is the current leader of the opposition Freedom Party, was arrested by SPAK on charges of ‘corruption, money laundering and non-declaration and concealment of wealth.’ During his presidency, the governing Socialist Party attempted to remove Meta from office twice – first in 2019 for refusing to call local elections amid an opposition boycott and again in 2021 for allegedly interfering in the general election. Although Meta has long been the subject of corruption allegations, in this particular case, fellow opposition politicians have come to his defense. Sali Berisha, leader of the opposition Democratic Party, criticized Meta’s arrest, saying: ‘Everything [being done] against him is political.’

In response to the country’s corruption crisis, Albanian prime minister Edi Rama unveiled a new ‘special commission’ tasked with eradicating corruption. The commission, formally titled the Special Commission for Deepening Reforms on Good Governance, Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption for Albania in the EU 2030, quickly received condemnation, with some in the opposition and civil society warning that the initiative could undermine SPAK, which had become the target of criticism by government officials for its investigations into ‘high-level graft involving ministers and Socialist Party officials.’

Moreover, the commission has faced a tepid reception from EU officials. The EU’s ambassador in Tirana, Silvio Gonzato, raised concerns about the commission’s apparent lack of independence and transparency, saying that any allegations should be addressed within the framework of an independent justice system and, more broadly, in accordance with the principles of separation of powers and robust checks and balances. Gonzato also encouraged Albania’s political leaders to take ‘preventive measures’ to fight political corruption in the country. He noted, however, that there are still politicians and powerful special interest groups in Albania that have ‘no interest in reform.’ If this situation persists and comprehensive anti-corruption reforms are not implemented, it appears unlikely that the EU will uphold Albania’s EU accession target of 2030. Given that Albania’s corruption crisis is emblematic of a broader issue across the Western Balkans, the region will likely remain outside the European Union for the foreseeable future.